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Modifying the Restrictions on Sentence Modification:
United States v. Cobb
I. INTRODUCTION
As of January 29, 2011, approximately 191,000 inmates were
serving sentences in federal prisons across the United States;1 of
these sentences that were handed down in 2008, nearly ninety-six
percent were the result of a plea agreement.2 In the federal criminal
system, the Sentencing Commission attempts to ensure that
defendants receive similar sentences for similar crimes by establishing
sentencing guidelines—a range in which defendants should be
sentenced for a particular crime.3 In part because judges are required
to consider the guidelines when issuing a sentence,4 the guidelines
play a key role in plea negotiations, serving as a basis upon which
prosecutors and defendants try to determine the best “deal.”5 The
Sentencing Commission reviews and adjusts the guidelines from time
to time based on a variety of factors.6 While in most cases a court
cannot modify a sentence once it is imposed, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) offers an exception when the defendant’s sentence was
based on a guideline that was subsequently reduced.7 In theory, this
prevents a defendant who was sentenced before a guideline

1. Quick
Facts,
FEDERAL
BUREAU
OF
PRISONS
(Jan.
29,
2011),
http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp.
2. 2008 Annual Report Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, Fig. C, UNITED
STATES
SENTENCING
COMMISSION,
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/
Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2008/FigC.pdf.
3. An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, UNITED STATES
SENTENCING
COMMISSION,
http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/
Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
4. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2 (2009); 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b)(1) (2006). Under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a sentencing court is
not “required” to always follow the guidelines. However, it may be an abuse of discretion for a
court to sentence outside the guidelines.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Bundy, 613 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2009), appeal
dismissed, vacated in part, 2010 WL 3516574 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 03, 2010); United States v.
Carrasquillo, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65671 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2009); United States v.
Franklin, 600 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is no doubt that the parties considered the
guidelines range during their negotiations . . . .”).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(n)–(p), (r)–(s) (2006).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006).

17

DO NOT DELETE

4/5/2011 7:30 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2011

reduction from receiving a longer sentence than a defendant
convicted of the same crime but sentenced after the reduction.
For several years this exception had its own very large exception
because circuit courts held that when a defendant entered into a
Rule 11 plea agreement, his sentence was based solely on the
agreement—even if the defendant, prosecutor, and court consulted
the guidelines—thus making him ineligible for a sentence
modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).8 In United States v.
Cobb,9 the Tenth Circuit joined what may be a new trend in
interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3582 by holding that a sentence pursuant
to a plea agreement may be based on the sentencing guidelines as
well as the Rule 11 agreement, thus making these defendants eligible
for sentence modifications. This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit
was correct in applying a broader interpretation of § 3582. Part II
outlines the facts and procedural history of Cobb. Part III then
discusses the legal background and basis for other circuits’ narrow
interpretation of the “based on” language of § 3582. Part IV
describes the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Cobb. Finally, Part V
discusses how the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation is well within the
statutory language and more in line with the purpose behind the
sentencing guidelines.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Cobb was charged with four crack cocaine-related offenses in
March 1999; he entered into a Rule 11(e)(1)(C)10 agreement, and
ultimately pled guilty to possession of 1000.5 grams of cocaine with
intent to distribute.11 The plea agreement stated that the sentence
would be determined by applying the sentencing guidelines, noted
that the guideline range was 168 to 210 months, and stipulated to a
sentence of 168 months, “the bottom of the applicable guideline
range.”12 At the sentencing hearing, the judge took note of the
guideline range and, finding no reason to depart from it, imposed
8. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2009); United States
v. Peveler, 359 F.3d 369, 372–73, 379 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Trujeque, 100 F.3d
869, 870 (10th Cir. 1996).
9. 584 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009), vacated and reinstated, 603 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir.
2010).
10. Now Rule 11(c)(1)(C).
11. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 981.
12. Id.
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the 168-month sentence, explaining that the “sentence [was] within
the guideline range.”13
In December 2007, the Sentencing Commission unanimously
reduced the sentencing guideline range base offense by two levels for
crack cocaine-related offenses and made the reduction retroactive,
effective March 2008.14 Under the revised crack cocaine guidelines,
the sentencing range for Cobb’s offense dropped from 168 months
to 135.15 When the revisions became retroactive, Cobb moved for a
new sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2),16 which allows a
court to consider modifying a sentence when the original sentence is
“based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by
the Sentencing Commission.”17 Cobb argued that his sentence
should be reduced to the bottom of the new range because the
sentence in his plea agreement was so tied to the guideline range that
his sentence was necessarily “based on” the guidelines.18 The
government argued that the sentence was based on the parties’ Rule
11 agreement, not the sentencing guidelines, but at the § 3582
hearing the prosecutor acknowledged that had the guidelines been
different at the time of sentencing, the plea agreement would also
have been different.19 The district court determined that the sentence
“rest[ed] squarely on the parties’ agreement,” and “as a matter of
fact and law” the sentence could not also be based on the
guidelines.20 Because the court found that the sentence was based on
Rule 11 and not the guideline range, it concluded that § 3582 did
not grant it authority to reduce the sentence and thus dismissed
Cobb’s modification motion for lack of jurisdiction.21

13. Id. at 982.
14. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL, Supplement to app. C,
Amendment 706 (Nov. 1, 2007) (regarding 2-level reduction); UNITED STATES SENTENCING
GUIDELINE MANUAL, Supplement to app. c, Amendment 713 (Nov. 1, 2009) (regarding
retroactivity).
15. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 982.
16. Id.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006).
18. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 982.
19. Id.
20. Appellee’s Answer Brief at 14, United States v. Cobb, 584 F.3d 979 (10th Cir.
2009) (No. 08-1213) (quoting Record on Appeal vol. V at 28).
21. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 981.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
With few exceptions, a court cannot modify a sentence once it is
imposed.22 One exception is 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which allows
the court to reduce the sentence “in the case of a defendant who has
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission,” provided that the reduction is consistent with the
commission’s policies.23 Though seemingly straightforward, the
interpretation of § 3582’s “based on” language is anything but
settled for sentences involving a plea agreement. The circuits that
have addressed the issue take opposing views, often with a vigorous
dissent promoting the majority position in another circuit, thus
making it clear that the question could have easily gone the other
way.24
A. Majority View—Narrow Construction of “Based On”
The majority of circuits hold that a Rule 11 agreement precludes
application of § 3582(c)(2) by either applying a narrow
interpretation of § 3582’s “based on” language, or borrowing
common law contract principles and applying them to plea
agreements.25 The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Peveler
determined that even if the plea agreement did no more than specify
an offense level, thus leaving the sentence to be determined from the
guidelines, because the case involved a plea agreement, the sentence
was based exclusively on the agreement and could not be based on a
guideline range for purposes of § 3582.26 Thus, defendants who
plea-bargain do not fall under the § 3582(c)(2) exception, and the

22. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).
23. Id. § 3582(c)(2).
24. See, e.g., Cobb, 584 F.3d 979; United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir.
2009); United States v. Dews, 551 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2008).
25. The Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits take this position. See Sanchez, 562
F.3d 275; United States v. Scurlark, 560 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bride,
581 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Peveler, 359 F.3d 369, 372–73, 379 (6th Cir.
2003).
26. 359 F.3d at 372–73, 379; see also United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 364
(7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a sentence imposed under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) arises directly from
the agreement itself, not from the guidelines).
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court has no authority to modify their sentences when the guidelines
change.27
In addition to holding that a plea agreement precludes
application of § 3582, majorities in the Third and Eighth Circuits,
and a dissenting judge in the Fourth Circuit, also emphasize the
contractual nature of plea agreements.28 In the Third Circuit, the
majority in United States v. Sanchez29 noted that even without the
dispute over what it means for a sentence to be “based on” the
guidelines, a plea agreement is a contract which binds all parties: the
defendant, government, and the court.30 In agreeing to a sentence,
the defendant gets what she bargained for, and a court does not have
the power to revise a contract if all parties do not agree to the
change.31 Just as a consumer cannot renegotiate an automobile
purchase when the price goes down a few years later, a defendant
cannot modify his sentence when the sentencing guidelines change.32
The Second Circuit appears to adopt this majority view. Recent
decisions involved distinguishable fact scenarios—defendants were
sentenced outside the applicable range,33 according to a statutory
minimum,34 or under a set of guidelines that had not been reduced.35
However, in an unpublished opinion, the court gave a nod of
approval to the line of cases that holds that the existence of a plea
agreement precludes application of § 3582 in all circumstances.36

27. Peveler, 359 F.3d at 379.
28. See Sanchez, 562 F.3d at 280; Scurlark, 560 F.3d at 842; Dews, 551 F.3d at 212
(Agee, J., dissenting); id. at 283 (Rendell, J., concurring).
29. Sanchez, 562 F.3d at 280 (“[A] sentence prescribed in a binding plea agreement is
not ‘based on’ a subsequently lowered sentencing range.”).
30. Id. at 282.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 282 n.7.
33. United States v. Main, 579 F.3d 200, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2009).
34. United States v. Torres, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18306 (2d Cir. Aug. 31, 2010).
35. United States v. Castillo, 378 F. App’x 80 (2d Cir. 2010).
36. United States v. Kornegay, 358 F. App’x 236, 238 (2d Cir. 2009). Kornegay’s
explicit approval of the strict view may be a response to United States v. Fruster, 669 F. Supp.
2d 341, 342 (W.D.N.Y. 2009), where a district court granted a sentence reduction, holding
that a plea agreement does not automatically preclude modification under § 3582(c)(2).
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B. Minority View: United States v. Dews
In contrast, the majority in United States v. Dews37 and the
dissenting judge in Sanchez argued that in cases where the guidelines
played a central role in determining the agreed sentence, “it strains
credulity to imagine that the plea agreement was not based on the
Guidelines.”38 In Dews, the court held that nothing in Rule 11
precludes a court from modifying a sentence under § 3582, nor does
§ 3582 require that the sentencing range be the sole basis for the
sentence.39 In certain circumstances, “a sentence may be both a
guidelines-based sentence . . . and a sentence stipulated to by the
parties in a plea agreement.”40 The dissent in Sanchez agreed, noting
that a defendant who agrees to a plea agreement does not
automatically waive his right to seek resentencing, and courts should
not reduce incentives to enter plea agreements by making those
defendants ineligible for a sentence modification in the event the
guidelines change.41
C. Undecided Circuits—Possible Trend Towards the Minority View
Until this year, the Seventh Circuit seemed to follow the
majority view,42 but that appears to be changing. In United States v.
Franklin,43 the court held that the defendant’s sentence could not be
reduced under § 3582 because there was no indication that the
parties intended to tie the stipulated sentence to the sentencing
guidelines.44 However, had the agreement made some reference to
the guidelines, the court concluded that it might have had authority
to review the defendant’s sentence for a possible reduction under
§ 3582.45

37. 551 F.3d 204, 209 (4th Cir. 2008) (vacated as moot). The panel decision was
vacated when the court agreed to hear the case en banc. While their decision was pending,
Dews completed his unmodified sentence and was released.
38. United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 284 (3d Cir. 2009) (Roth, J., dissenting).
39. Dews, 551 F.3d at 209, 212.
40. Id. at 209.
41. Sanchez, 562 F.3d at 283.
42. See United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 364 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
“[a] sentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea arises directly from the agreement itself,
not from the [g]uidelines”).
43. 600 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2010).
44. Id. at 896.
45. Id. at 896–97.

22

DO NOT DELETE

17

4/5/2011 7:30 PM

Modifying the Restrictions on Sentence Modification

The Fifth Circuit currently appears to agree with the majority;
however, there is room in its case law to go either way. In United
States v. Garcia, the court applied a hybrid approach, concluding
that a defendant who was sentenced on the high end of the original
guidelines was eligible for a reduction, but the sentence could not be
reduced below the plea agreement’s 240-month minimum.46
Although the Fifth Circuit seemed to grant district courts
jurisdiction to consider a reduction under § 3582, it also adopted
the contract approach, stating that because plea agreements are
binding on all parties, a court cannot modify a sentence beyond what
is allowed in the Rule 11 agreement.47
D. Tenth Circuit Precedent: United States v. Trujeque
Until Cobb, United States v. Trujeque48 was the leading Tenth
Circuit opinion addressing sentence modifications in plea agreement
situations and was relied on by other circuits as establishing that a
plea agreement precludes the application of § 3582.49
Trujeque was indicted on various charges relating to possession
and distribution of Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (“LSD”); he pled
guilty and agreed to a sentence of eighty-four months.50 Trujeque
later moved for a reduced sentence based on the then-recently
revised LSD sentencing guidelines, but the court determined that
because Trujeque was sentenced pursuant to the stipulated
agreement, his sentence was not based on a sentencing range that
was subsequently lowered.51 The stipulated sentence was outside the
calculated range, but the court stated that this fact was immaterial to
its analysis.52

46. 606 F.3d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 2010).
47. Id.
48. 100 F.3d 869 (10th Cir. 1996).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 339 F. App’x 872 (10th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Schurlark, 560 F.3d 839 (8th Cir.
2009); United States v. Peveler, 359 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2003).
50. Trujeque, 100 F.3d at 870.
51. Id. at 870–71.
52. Id. at 871 n.3.
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IV. UNITED STATES V. COBB
In United States v. Cobb,53 the Tenth Circuit broke from the
majority view, going against the common interpretation of Trujeque,
and concluding that a Rule 11 plea agreement does not preclude
application of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Because parties often look to
the sentencing guidelines in determining a stipulated sentence, it is
“unrealistic” to claim that such sentences are not based on a
guideline range.54
A. Cobb’s Plea Agreement
The multiple references to the sentencing guidelines in the
negotiation process, final agreement, and at sentencing were
important factors in the court’s conclusion. During sentencing, the
trial judge told Cobb that the guidelines helped define his sentence,
and he saw no reason to depart from the guidelines. He also said that
the guidelines set out by the parties were correct, and the stipulated
sentence was the bottom of the guideline range.55 In addition,
during the § 3582 hearing, the prosecutor acknowledged that “if the
[g]uidelines had been a different number . . . probably the [p]lea
[a]greement would have been a different number.”56 To the Tenth
Circuit, these facts indicated that Cobb’s sentence “was tied to the
guidelines at every step.”57
B. Distinguishing Trujeque
Although many courts, and the dissent in Cobb, cite Trujeque as
precedent for not allowing a court to consider a reduction when the
party enters into a plea agreement, its factual differences made it easy
for the majority to dismiss its precedential value. The guideline range
in Trujeque was 121 to 151 months, but the plea agreement called

53. United States v. Cobb, 584 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 595
th
th
F.3d 1202 (10 Cir. 2010), original opinion reinstated, 603 F.3d 1201 (10 Cir. 2010). After
the decision was filed, the Tenth Circuit granted the United States’ petition for rehearing en
banc and vacated the initial decision. Following briefing and rehearing, the original opinion
was reinstated.
54. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 985.
55. Id. at 981, 984.
56. Id. at 982 (citing the record) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 983.
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for eighty-four months, well outside the guideline range, making it
clear that his sentence was not based on the guidelines.58
The majority argued that Cobb’s situation was more similar to
the defendant in Dews, where the sentencing court accepted the plea
agreements only after confirming that the stipulated sentences fell
within the guidelines.59 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Fourth
Circuit’s holding that “nothing in the language of § 3582(c)(2) or
in the language of Rule 11 precludes a defendant who pleads guilty
under Rule 11 . . . from later benefitting from a favorable retroactive
guideline amendment.”60 A sentence may be based on both the
guidelines and a Rule 11 plea agreement when the stipulated
sentence falls within the guideline range.61
The Tenth Circuit also rejected other circuits’ practice of treating
plea agreements as contracts that cannot be changed without
agreement by both parties. “We are construing a statute, not
common law. Importing contract ideas into our assessment of
§ 3582 . . . misdirect[s] our focus . . . .”62 The court found no
indication that Congress intended to limit eligibility for a sentence
reduction to only non-negotiated sentences; the language of the
statute “generally allows for reductions of sentences which are based
in any way on a qualifying range.”63
C. Policy Considerations
Though not a large portion of the opinion, the court cited the
policy reasons behind sentencing guidelines to further reinforce its
decision. One of Congress’s goals in creating the sentencing
commission was to reduce unwarranted disparity in sentencing.64
Because plea agreements comprise over ninety percent of all
sentences, barring these defendants from receiving a modification
under § 3582 undermines this goal.65 The narrow interpretation also
ignores the significant role the guidelines play in helping parties

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. (citing United States v. Trujeque, 100 F.3d 869, 870 (10th Cir. 1996)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 984–85.
Id. at 985.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006)).
Id.
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negotiate an appropriate sentence.66 For the Tenth Circuit, “[i]t is
simply unrealistic to think that the applicable guideline range is not a
major factor (if not the major factor) in reaching a stipulated
sentence.”67
D. Dissent
Judge Hartz’s dissent followed the more common interpretation
of § 3582—that a sentence imposed pursuant to a Rule 11
agreement is based on the agreement, not the guidelines, and is thus
ineligible for modification under § 3582, even if the parties
considered the guidelines when forming their agreement.68 Judge
Hartz quoted the agreement language, “[t]he parties agree that this
plea agreement is entered into pursuant to the provisions of Rule
11(e)(1)(C),” as proof that the sentence was based on Rule 11 and
not the guidelines.69 He acknowledged that the parties and
sentencing judge looked at the guidelines, but emphasized that it
was just one of several factors that were considered.70
The dissent argued that the majority interpreted § 3582(c)(2)’s
language so broadly, allowing any guidelines-based sentence to
satisfy the restriction, that virtually every sentence is eligible for
modification.71 Under the majority’s reading, a plea agreement could
be modified if any “one of the essential parties—the prosecutor, the
defendant, or the district court—considered the guidelines in
deciding whether the stipulated sentence was a good idea.”72
Because parties always look at the guidelines, Judge Hartz feared
that the majority had opened the door for almost every sentence to
be modified.73
Judge Hartz argued that a sentence should be eligible for
modification “based on a sentencing range” only if the guideline
range was miscalculated.74 Because Cobb could not have appealed his
sentence on the ground that the range was miscalculated, his
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

26

Id.
Id.
Id. at 985 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
Id. at 986.
Id. at 987.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sentence was not “based on a guidelines sentencing range and
cannot be modified under § 3582(c)(2).”75
The dissent also pointed out that while the facts of Trujeque
were different, the difference was immaterial because that case did
not rely on the fact that the sentence was outside the guidelines
range.76 Furthermore, the majority erred by relying on Dews because
that opinion was vacated when the court agreed to hear the case en
banc.77
V. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of § 3582(c)(2) is well within
the statutory language. Cobb does not automatically reduce every
stipulated sentence. Rather, as stated by the statute, it merely grants
the district court discretion to review the sentence and decide “if
such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission.”78 While this will require
courts to look at the actual merits of motions for sentence reduction
rather than simply dismissing them for lack of jurisdiction, this
interpretation is more consistent with the intent of the statute and
the policies behind the sentencing guidelines.
A. Cobb’s Interpretation of § 3582(c)(2) Is Well Within the Statutory
Language
In granting courts authority to reduce certain sentences,
§ 3582(c)(2) makes no distinction between sentences imposed
following a trial and those imposed following a plea deal.79 All that is
required is that the sentence be “based on” a guideline range that is
subsequently lowered. During plea negotiations, parties almost
always look to the guidelines in order to determine whether the
suggested agreement is fair.80 And even after the prosecutor and

75. Id. at 988.
76. Id.
77. Id. Dews was vacated for a rehearing en banc, but the case was dismissed without an
opinion because Dews completed his sentence before the case was reheard.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Franklin, 600 F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is
no doubt that the parties considered the guidelines range during their negotiations.”); United
States v. Bundy, 613 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2009); United States v. Carrasquillo, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 65671 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2009); United States v. Oliver, 589 F. Supp. 2d 39, 40
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defendant have formed an agreement, the district court is required to
look at the guidelines when imposing the sentence.81 Considering
that courts readily acknowledge that prosecutors and defense
attorneys depend heavily on the guidelines in determining plea deals,
the Tenth Circuit is correct in calling it “unrealistic” to think that
the resulting sentences are not based on the guidelines. This is
especially true in Cobb’s case, where the plea agreement indicated
several times that it was based on the applicable guidelines.82 In
addition, because the statute is unclear as to whether it can be
applied in plea agreements, the rule of lenity should apply to
interpret the statute in favor of the accused.83
The majority was also correct in refusing to apply contract
principles when interpreting criminal statutes. Characterizing plea
agreements as simple contracts that are final and binding on both
parties84 overlooks the fact that modern criminal law is based on
statute, not common law, and there is no authority for importing
common law into criminal statutes.85 A guilty plea “involves the
waiver of at least three constitutional rights by a defendant . . .
therefore, the analogy of a plea agreement to a traditional contract is
not complete or precise, and the application of ordinary contract law
principles to a plea agreement is not always appropriate.”86 Even if a
plea agreement is binding, common law principles borrowed from
contract law are superseded by § 3582’s express provision allowing
for a sentence’s revision when it is based on the sentencing
guidelines. Finally, comparing plea deals to commercial contracts
seems inappropriate, as criminal law and sentencing deal with a

(D.D.C. 2008) (“Certainly, the sentencing guidelines may have some bearing on what
sentence a defendant decides to plead to because they help inform the defendant of what
sentence he could be facing in the event that he decides to go to trial.”).
81. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2 (2009).
82. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 981, 982 (majority opinion).
83. Few courts have examined the application of the rule of lenity in sentencing statutes,
but some courts indicate that it may apply. See, e.g., United States v. Jeter, 329 F.3d 1229,
1230 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
84. See United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v.
Scurlark, 560 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Dews, 551 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir.
2008) (Agee, J., dissenting).
85. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 981, 984. But see United States v. Peveler, 359 F.3d 369, 375
(6th Cir. 2004).
86. Peveler, 359 F.3d at 375 (quoting United States v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541 (8th
Cir. 1990)).
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defendant’s life and liberty—issues much more significant than the
price of a commodity.
B. The Tenth Circuit Is Not Bound by Neighboring Circuits
While the majority of circuits take a stricter interpretation of
what it means for a sentence to be “based on” the sentencing
guidelines, nothing prevents the Tenth Circuit from adjusting its
prior interpretation of § 3582. In addition, the recent crack cocaine
amendments appear to have prompted other circuits to reconsider
their prior interpretations and move in the direction of Cobb.
The dissent makes a strong argument in noting that because
Trujeque did not look to whether the sentence was within the
guideline range, the factual distinction alone is not firm enough
ground for adopting a completely different interpretation.87
However, there are circumstances where a court should re-examine
past reasoning to prevent perpetuating an incorrect decision,
particularly when a different interpretation does no violence to the
statutory language.
Although the dissent was correct that Dews was vacated as moot,
the majority did not wholly rely on Dews in determining that a
sentence could be based on more than one factor. Rather, it did
what courts often do when facing a legal question—it looked at
various arguments and adopted those it found most persuasive.
C. Sentence Reduction Is Not Automatic
The majority’s interpretation of § 3582(c)(2) will not allow
nearly every sentence to be modified because the statute places
additional limits on whether a sentence can be reduced. In addition,
many sentences are based on additional factors or guidelines other
than those that were reduced.
The statute makes it clear that a revision in the guidelines does
not make a sentence reduction automatic; rather, the court must
consider “the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that
they are applicable” and grant a reduction “if such a reduction is
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.”88 These factors include the nature and circumstances

87. United States v. Trujeque, 100 F.3d 869, 871 n.3 (10th Cir. 1996).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006).
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of the offense, the history of the defendant, and the need to show
the public the seriousness of the offense.89 Cobb does not remove
these statutory limits; it simply grants the district court the authority
to review a plea agreement where the sentence was based on a
reduced guideline and decide whether the sentencing factors warrant
a reduced sentence.
Another limit to Cobb’s effect on sentence reduction is that, in
many cases, a defendant is sentenced based on a mandatory
minimum or career offender calculation, rather than the particular
set of guidelines that were subsequently reduced.90 In these cases, a
defendant cannot be considered for a modified sentence.
D. Purpose and Policy
Finally, the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of § 3582 is correct in
light of the purpose and policy behind the sentencing guidelines.
The Sentencing Commission was created in part to “provide
certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing,
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal
conduct.”91 This purpose is defeated when a defendant who is
sentenced within the guidelines after going to trial is eligible to
receive a reduced sentence, while a defendant who is charged with a
similar crime and sentenced within the guidelines after negotiating a
plea deal is ineligible. The public interest in promoting plea bargains
(in part because they save the time and expense of preparing for and
conducting a full trial) is undermined when defendants who plea
receive the additional punishment of being ineligible for a sentence
reduction for no reason other than they saved public resources by
not going to trial.92

89. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Tupuola, 587 F.3d 1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding
that a defendant was ineligible for a sentence reduction because his sentence was based on
career offender rather than crack cocaine guidelines).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).
92. United States v. Cobb, 584 F.3d 979, 985 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 283 (3d Cir. 2009) (Roth, J., dissenting).
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Modifying the Restrictions on Sentence Modification
VI. CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit was correct in holding that a sentence based
on sentencing guidelines should receive the same treatment under
§ 3582, regardless of whether sentencing occurred after a trial or as
the result of a plea agreement. Nothing in § 3582 states that plea
agreements based on sentencing guidelines cannot be considered for
a subsequent modification, or that the sentencing range must be the
sole basis of a sentence in order for the statute to apply. The Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Cobb does not mean that defendants’ sentences
will be automatically modified every time the guidelines are reduced;
rather, it allows the district courts to consider sentencing factors and
policies to determine if a reduction is appropriate. While it will
require courts to look at the merits of a case rather than simply
dismissing it out of hand, a more careful review is required in order
to fulfill the purposes of the sentencing guidelines.
Jackie Bosshardt

 J.D. Candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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